Justice or Security in Post Conflict Sudan A Comprehensive Review

Abstract

Issam AW Mohamed

This paper examines the foundational trade off between accountability for atrocity crimes and the urgent need to end armed violence—what Sudanese civil society terms the “Devil’s Dilemma” (Ù?زأÙ? Ù?اطÙ?Ø´Ù?ا(. Focusing on the prospective surrender or negotiation of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s ongoing civil war (2023–2026), the paper develops a theoretical and comparative framework for analyzing whether, when, and how states may lawfully and legitimately offer conditional amnesties or reduced sentences to perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Drawing on the jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the evolving customary international law debate on amnesties, and the transitional justice experiences of South Africa (Truth and Reconciliation Commission), Rwanda (gacaca courts), Colombia (Special Jurisdiction for Peace), Liberia (Charles Taylor), Sierra Leone (Lomé Accord), and six original Sudanese case studies (1999 Amnesty Law; 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement; 2019–2021 transition; 2021 coup; 2020 Juba Peace Agreement; El Geneina massacres), the paper argues that unconditional amnesty is legally impermissible and politically dangerous, while blanket rejection of any accommodation is practically catastrophic. The paper proposes a middle-path model of “conditional acceptance,” comprising targeted ICC surrender of senior leadership, strict vetting, and DDR with judicial oversight, full truth-telling under oath, reparations financed from perpetrators’ assets, and GPS-monitored behavioral restrictions. Four analytical tables and three detailed scenarios (optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely) project the outcomes of different policy choices. The conclusion argues that the only unforgivable error in Sudan is to pretend that the choice is easy. That delayed justice is not abandoned justice if the delay saves lives.

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