An Examination of the Timing of Financial Incentives and Audit Committee Strength on the Likelihood to Whistleblow

Abstract

Afia A OPPONG

The US regulatory environment has various whistleblower programs that allow external fraud reporting, with financial rewards for whistleblowers. However, the period between the initial tip and the reward continues to increase. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act generated an increased focus on audit committees’ roles as monitors of internal whistleblowing processes to encourage internal reporting. This study examines the relationship between the timing of financial incentives (long vs. short), audit committee strength (strong vs. weak), and the likelihood of whistleblowing. A sample of 95 financial professionals indicated a likelihood of whistleblowing regarding potential financial statement fraud. The results indicate that internal whistleblowing is more likely when the audit committee is strong; the respondents associated a strong audit committee with increased protection from retaliation and trust compared to scenarios involving a weak audit committee. This study has implications for firms, regulators, and stakeholders in structuring new and existing whistleblower programs.

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