Unraveling the Effects of US Foreign Policy in Africa

Key Points

Militarization, Securitization, Counterterrorism, Mixed-Methods Research, Panel Data Model, System Generalized Method of Moments

Introduction

The historical bond between the US and Africa, rooted in transatlantic slavery, drove the US to play a significant role in decolonization and post-independence politics. However, Africa has faced many challenges, including poverty, corruption, wars, Cold War alliances, and Western interventions in the continent's political and economic affairs, which have contributed to political instability.² Scholars have described US foreign policy toward Africa after the end of the Cold War as chaotic and unstable.³ It has been argued that the US's renewed strategic interests in Africa in the aftermath of 9/11 are due to energy security, regional security to protect its economic and security interests, threats posed by violent extremist groups that have created sanctuaries in the swaths of ungoverned spaces, and China’s political influence and investment in the continent.⁴ This paper seeks to examine whether there is any causal relationship between US foreign policy militarization and political stability/instability in Africa. The militarization of US foreign policy started during the Cold War, when the US provided extensive military assistance to authoritarian anti-communist regimes and rebel groups in Africa.⁵ Several scholars have criticized US foreign policy militarization because the continent is inundated with conflicts and civil wars in which European colonialization has played a critical role.⁶ The article explores US foreign policy toward Africa in three crucial periods: the Cold War, the post-Cold War, and the post-9/11 era. The paper critically examines independent variables, including military aid, US training of African armed forces, security and humanitarian interventions, and US troops stationed in Africa, and the dependent variables, terrorism casualties, civil wars, coups, and anti-government demonstrations. The paper aims to establish if any association or relationship exists between the explanatory and response variables in the study. In this article, I apply the securitization theory espoused by the Copenhagen School, scholars including Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, to understand why the US referred to Africa’s failed states, ungoverned areas/spaces, poverty, underdevelopment, and humanitarianism as a security threat during the global war on terror.

After the collapse of the Cold War, the US abandoned its autocratic, repressive allies and shifted its foreign policy to promote democracy, human rights, and a free-market economy in Africa. These policies and norms were tied to US foreign aid to compel regimes in Africa to move away from one-party rule, which promotes corruption and human rights abuses. The Cold War offered the US and other Western governments a unique opportunity to impose their economic and political values worldwide, with Africa as a prime target. International Financial Institutions have also made democratization a precondition for African states to obtain foreign aid and loans (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank).⁷

The US policy of militarization toward Africa has intensified after the terrorist attacks and the introduction of the global war on terror policy. Africa has been heavily securitized due to the emerging violent extremist organizations that the US wanted to deny a haven and neutralize their existence on the continent. During the post- 9/11 period, the US increased military aid and established several counterterrorism and counterinsurgency programs to train African security forces to combat and prevent terrorist organizations from having a foothold on the continent. Many scholars have criticized the US deployment of military personnel to perform development and humanitarian functions that were formerly reserved for civilian institutions and agencies. Evidence from the existing literature has demonstrated that the US has deployed over 7,500 military personnel and private contractors in Africa and a Reaper Drone base in the Sahel.⁸ For example, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggests that US foreign policy should be centered on 3D, which involves diplomacy, development, and defense. This strategy is referred to as a “whole-of-government approach.” It can reduce conflicts instead of militarization, which exacerbates the problem. Some political analysts and commentators believe that the US's so-called policy contributes to a culture of violence, kidnapping, hostage- taking, and the development of mercenary and rebel groups on the continent through the proliferation of weapons and arms sent to fragile and failed states. US policy militarization has made it easy for criminals to get access to guns and weapons to be involved in drug and human trafficking.⁹ In Africa, several government leaders use excessive force to achieve their political goals when dealing with citizens during protests or anti-government demonstrations. Empirical research finds that some of the military assistance given to African governments, especially arms and weapons, are sold on the black market, where violent extremist organizations can freely purchase. It has been argued that arms imported from the US have become a strong predictor of conflicts and human rights violations in many African countries. For example, armed forces in Nigeria and Uganda used US security assistance to repress dissent, and this generated grievances among the population that led to instability.

US Cold War Militarization Policy

The US was committed to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East during the Cold War, with less support for Africa, and policymakers viewed the continent as a ‘backwater.’¹⁰ The US used its ideology and interests to shape the Cold War in Africa and provided authoritarian governments with massive foreign aid as a containment strategy against the Soviet Union. However, the support for autocratic governments on the continent did not promote the democracy and freedom that the US espoused. The US's official relationship with the continent, aside from the historical bond through transatlantic slavery, began in 1958, following Ghana’s independence. The State Department established the Bureau of African Affairs to strengthen democratic institutions and support economic growth, peace, and security. Despite these efforts by the US, many scholars argued that the Cold War policy toward Africa was strategic in containing the Soviet expansionist policy, a source of raw material, and critical minerals for US industries.¹¹ During the Cold War, the US supported several authoritarian anti-communist repressive governments and supplied these leaders with massive military aid, including arms, weapons, and training, such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and supported some non-state insurgent groups and was involved in proxy wars on the continent, particularly the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi. Anecdotal evidence showed that the US assisted in the overthrow of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, and the DRC has become a client state. Several scholars believe this was the genesis of the many civil wars in the country to the present.¹² Qualitative evidence indicates that the US provided more than 1 billion dollars to support Mobutu’s government in the DRC between 1961 and 1990. In addition, the US convinced the International Financial Institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) to give loans to Mobutu’s government, which had helped the dictator rule for almost three decades. The autocratic government conducted gross human rights violations and repressed political dissents with impunity during his administration.¹³ A plethora of scholars argued that US Cold War policy contributed to civil wars in several client states such as Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Sierra Leone.¹⁴Africa has never featured heavily on the US global agenda during the Cold War, except for security and economic interests, because the continent’s contribution to international trade was insignificant. The US deserted its autocratic, repressive client regimes after the disintegration of the Cold War and adopted a new foreign policy for Africa.

US Post-Cold War Policy in Africa

The US faced security threats from al-Qaeda and Islamic violent extremist organizations in Africa, particularly in Sudan and Libya, during the post-Cold War period. However, the death of US military personnel in the battle for Mogadishu changed its African policy. The US desire to contain rogue states and Islamic extremism in Africa compelled it to support anti-Western and anti-democratic regimes and movements on the continent. Terrorism played a minor role in US-Africa relations immediately after the collapse of the Cold War, and the threat to regional stability and the protection of the population during the conflict triggered the US intervention in Somalia in 1993. Moreover, the US provided logistics, military equipment, training, and financial resources to support regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and individual African nations, thereby playing a critical role in conflict resolution. The continent became a spotlight for the US national security strategy after the two embassies were bombed in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998.¹⁶ Despite the US policy of disengagement after the death of the 18 soldiers in Somalia, Clinton’s administration's economic policy toward the continent changed dramatically by establishing the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which became the cornerstone of US financial and trade policy toward Africa and provides duty-free access to the US market.¹⁷ The continent still lacks a US security policy to eliminate perennial wars and conflicts, until a dramatic change after 9/11.

US Militarization Policy After 9/11

The US policy of militarization intensified after 9/11, when the US incorporated Africa into its National Security Policy due to three critical reasons: the global war on terror, energy security, and counter-Chinese political influence and investment in the continent, which the US views as a national security threat.¹⁸ A report by the neoconservative Project for the New American Century (PNAC) indicated that US reliance on oil has reached a critical stage and that the US must turn to sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the Gulf of Guinea, for oil imports. President George W. Bush declared Africa’s oil a “strategic national interest and a resource the US must choose to control through military force.”¹⁹ The US policymakers viewed Africa’s weak, failed, and ungoverned spaces as a sanctuary for terrorist organizations, which posed a significant threat to its security and economic interests. Against this background, the US increased military assistance. The US established several training programs for African military forces to combat terrorist organizations and prevent them from having a foothold on the continent. The US established many counterterrorism and counterinsurgency programs across Africa, notably the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), and Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Saharan (OET- TS) to neutralize al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali and Boko Haram in Nigeria. A Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was established to combat threats posed by al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda. Due to the threats posed by violent extremist organizations, the US deployed 1,800 military personnel at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti to deter, counter, and disrupt terrorist threats in the Horn of Africa. These organizations also provided training to African military forces.²⁰ The US footprint on the continent after the attacks was unprecedented and created forward operating bases, cooperative security locations, and contingency locations to deal with terrorist threats emanating from Africa.²¹

In addition to counterterrorism programs, the US established the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which trains African military officers at US military schools. Almost all African countries participated in the military capacity- building program. These African military officers are trained to promote democratic norms, respect for human rights, and civilian control of the armed forces. The militarization of US foreign policy toward Africa also featured in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. This program sells unwanted US military equipment to some African countries. For example, in 2008, the US sold police hardware worth more than $175 million to Algeria, $2 million to Botswana, $3 million to Kenya, $19 million to Morocco, $17 million to Nigeria, and $61 million to South Africa.²² Naval Operations are carried out in the Gulf of Guinea by US military personnel to protect the security of the oil-rich region against Nigeria’s insurgent group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA).

After the Rwandan genocide, the US established the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to train African militaries to perform peacekeeping roles in conflict regions on the continent. However, due to criticism from many African leaders, it was replaced by the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program—the US-trained 248,000 peacekeeping forces from twenty-five African countries for the United Nations and the African Union. AFRICOM becomes the US’s most significant combatant command for militarization in Africa. The command was created to protect America, Americans, and American interests against the threats posed by al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).²³ Militarization has become the US post-Cold War and post-9/11 statecraft. According to AFRICOM reports, the US maintained 6,000 military forces and 1,500 contractors on the continent.²⁴

The war on terror, like the Cold War, boosted US military personnel presence on the continent and also increased external support for authoritarian, repressive African governments. The US involvement in Africa has been pronounced and escalated since the post-9/11 period to fight the growing capabilities and threats of violent extremist organizations, particularly in Nigeria, Mali, and Somalia.²⁵ Despite the US efforts to neutralize violent extremist organizations on the continent, extremist groups continued to expand and thrive across borders^.26 US militarization policy in Africa exacerbates conflicts on the continent.²⁷ The US’s primary goal is to degrade, neutralize, and defeat extremist and transnational organizations by denying them a haven and promoting regional stability and prosperity in the continent.²⁸

This paper builds on Abrahamsen’s 2005 concept of the securitization of Africa’s development and humanitarian issues, which was seen as a security threat to Western countries. After 9/11, US policymakers used a speech act to securitize Africa’s poverty, underdevelopment, failed states, and ungoverned areas, framing them as threats through the ‘security-development hypothesis.”²⁹ They attributed poverty and underdevelopment in Africa as the main reasons driving people to join extremist groups. This securitization led to the creation of Africa Command and to other non-military initiatives, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).³⁰ The continent is often depicted as a source of trouble rather than an opportunity. However, many scholars believe that the US securitized Africa not only because of the rise in violent extremist groups but also because of oil, which was confirmed by President George W. Bush’s statement that African oil is a strategic interest, a resource that the US might seek to control through military force. The securitization and militarization of Africa have benefited several leaders practicing illiberal democracy, including Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Museveni of Uganda, and Meles of Ethiopia, who have gained significantly from their relations with the US.

Research Design

The research paper utilized a mixed-methods design, which has been seen as a third methodological movement.³¹ I first collate quantitative data from multiple sources on the variables of interest across the 54 recognized African states and then apply a dynamic panel data model. Because of the research question the study aims to answer, I have used a mixed-methods design. The design integrates quantitative and qualitative data within a single study. By combining quantitative and qualitative data, mixed- methods research uses the strengths of both approaches while using their weaknesses to provide an integrated, comprehensive understanding of the topic and phenomenon under investigation.³² The design offers an in-depth knowledge of the phenomena under investigation and enables the researcher to answer the research questions with sufficient depth and breadth. Mixed methods provide the best chance of answering research questions by combining the strengths of two techniques while compensating for each technique's weaknesses.³³ According to Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016), the strengths of qualitative methods offset the weaknesses of quantitative techniques, and vice versa. This implies that a quantitative method can be strong in areas where a qualitative approach is weak and vice versa. In addition, its data triangulation strategy produces well-validated conclusions and robust findings.³⁴ This approach captures the complexities of US foreign policy militarization and provides a comprehensive understanding of its implications in Africa.

Furthermore, a nested analysis will guide the selection of cases. The study will begin with a quantitative analysis, and the empirical results will determine the qualitative case selection. This approach provides a robust basis for causal inference rather than separating the qualitative and quantitative methods.³⁵ The paper aims to predict scores and describe the relationship between variables of interest and their effects on African countries.

The paper uses statistical techniques to analyze the data and examine the hypotheses. However, a dynamic panel model analysis determines a causal relationship between the study’s independent, lagged dependent, and response variables. This analysis will address endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, omitted variables, measurement error, and simultaneity between the independent and dependent variables using Arellano and Bover’s 1995 system generalized method of moments (GMM). Dynamic panel data models inform researchers that the past needs to be accounted for when dealing with variables that exhibit endogeneity. To address this problem, the researcher must use one or more lag-dependent variables that interpret the model's history.³⁶ The GMM technique is employed when the lagged dependent variable depends on its own past realizations. In addition, the GMM yields unbiased estimates because the lagged dependent variable helps eliminate autocorrelation and captures the phenomenon's dynamics. The system GMM estimator improves the precision of regression results and reduces bias in conclusions.

Data Collection

This paper draws on various credible sources for its quantitative data on US foreign policy militarization toward Africa. These sources include the USAID Greenbook for military aid, Security Assistance Monitor Data for US trainees, US Congressional Research Service Data for security and humanitarian interventions, Defense Manpower Data Center for US troops deployed in Africa, Uppsala Conflict Data Program for civil war, Global Terrorism Data for terrorism casualties, Coup d’ Etat Project Data and Coup Agency Mechanisms Data for coups, and the Armed Conflict and Event Data Project for anti-government demonstrations. Using these reputable datasets not only strengthens the study’s credibility but also ensures the reliability of the findings. These datasets have been employed to determine the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables in the study, providing a solid foundation for the research and instilling confidence in the audience.

Control Variables in the Study

The existing literature on US foreign policy militarization and political stability utilizes many control variables. However, this article selects control variables based on theoretical considerations regarding the independent and dependent variables. The control variables protect the study’s explanatory and response variables, avoiding inconsistencies and undue bias in the research conclusions and findings.37 In addition, control variables are not variables of interest; therefore, they are held constant in the study, preventing biases like omitted variable bias from affecting the research outcomes. The control variables also help the researcher to establish a causal relationship between the predictor and response variables in the study. The variables include US oil imports, resource curse, total population, GDP per capita, maternal mortality, and regime types.

Hypotheses in the Study

• The higher the level of US military aid to an African country, the greater the likelihood of terrorist attacks in that country.

• The higher the security interventions in the African country, the greater the likelihood of terrorist attacks.

• The higher the number of US military troops deployed in an African country, the greater the likelihood of terrorist attacks.

• The higher the number of US military trainees in an African country, the greater the likelihood of terrorist attacks in that country.

• The higher the number of US security interventions in an African country, the greater the likelihood of civil war in that country.

• The higher the number of US military trainees in an African country, the greater the likelihood of civil war in that country.

• The higher the level of US military aid to an African country, the greater the likelihood of coups in that country.

• The higher the number of US security interventions in an African country, the greater the likelihood of coups in that country.

• The higher the level of US military aid to an African country, the greater the likelihood of anti-government demonstrations.

• The higher the number of humanitarian interventions in an African country, the greater the likelihood of coups in that country.

Empirical Results and Descriptive Statistics

Empirical Results of Terrorism Casualties and Discussion

The findings are based on dynamic panel model data analysis using the Arellano-Bover 1995 and Blundell-Bond 1998 System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Table 1 shows the results of military aid, security, and humanitarian interventions, US troops, US military trainees, and lagged dependent variables, explaining their effects on the response variable terrorism casualties. The correlation coefficient in the regression analysis measures the strength of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The regression analysis shows that US troops stationed in African countries have a positive coefficient of 0.309, statistically significant at p < 0.5, in the dynamic panel data model. This empirical evidence indicates that US troops deployed in Africa affect terrorism casualties. Statistical significance indicates a positive association between the response and the independent variable (US troops). This implies that as US troops increase on the continent, terrorist casualties also increase. Therefore, the presence of US troops affects the increase in terrorism casualties. This empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the higher the number of US military troops deployed in an African country, the greater the likelihood of terrorism casualties in that country.

Moreover, the US military trainees in the model record a negative coefficient of -0. 0245, which is statistically significant with a p-value less than 0.05. The result demonstrates that as US military trainees increase on the African continent, terrorism casualties decrease. This shows that there is no relationship between the two variables. The independent and response variables are inversely related, meaning they move in opposite directions. The independent variable does not affect the dependent or response variable in the model. In addition, the lagged dependent variable in the model has a positive coefficient of 0.395 and is statistically significant, with a p-value less than 0.001. This means that terrorism casualties of the previous year play a tremendous role in future terrorism casualties. Therefore, an association exists between the terrorism casualties and the lagged dependent variable. Empirical evidence shows that countries hosting US troops stand at a high risk of growing terrorism casualties as compared to regions without US troops. Other independent variables in the dynamic panel model are insignificant. I believe US troops in the model are statistically significant due to the increase in soldiers after 9/11 to fight the global war on terrorism through several counterterrorism programs on the continent.

Terrorism Casualties	System GMM
Lagged terrorism casualties	0.395*** (16.16)
Military aid	6.42e-08 (0.60)
Security interventions	6.847 (0.12)
Humanitarian interventions	37.32 (0.32)
US troops	0.39* (2.29)
US military trainees	-0.0245* (-2.33)
Total oil imports	-0.00365*** (-11.45)
GDP Growth Annual Rate	1.553 (0.98)
GDP Per Capita	0.0933*** (5.48)
Total Population	0.0000115*** (13.23)
Maternal Mortality	0.217 (1.81)
Democracy	-41.68 (-0.67)
_cons	-464.7***
N	(-6.25)
Number of Groups	756
Number of Instruments	49
T statistics in parentheses	299
*p<0.05, **p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001

                                                                            Table 1: Predicting Terrorism Casualties Across Africa, 1995-2020

Empirical results of the Lagged Dependent variable, Terrorism Casualties, and Lagged Independent variables

Table 2 results show that lagged dependent variables, terrorism casualties, lagged independent variables, US trainees, and military aid are statistically significant in the dynamic panel model. The lagged terrorism casualties record a coefficient of 0.46 and are statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.001. In addition, lagged military aid records a positive coefficient of 0.000000333, statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The lagged US military trainees also show a positive coefficient of 0.0722 (p-value <0.001) in the regression model. The dynamic panel model shows a positive relationship between the lagged dependent variable and the response variable. The lagged dependent variable in the study represents the model’s history by measuring its past. The positive association in the model implies that as the dependent variable increases, the lagged dependent variable, which measures the variable's past, tends to increase as well. For example, the current year’s terrorism casualties are not responsible for instability. Instead, the previous years could have played a significant role. The empirical evidence indicates that lagged terrorism casualties affect the model's response variable. This means that terrorism casualties of the previous year influence future terrorism casualties in the dynamic panel analysis.

Furthermore, lagged military aid is positively related to the dependent variable. This means that US military aid of the previous year influences or affects future terrorism casualties on the continent. As the lagged independent variable increases, the response variable increases as well. Similarly, the lagged independent variable, US military trainees, also exhibits a positive association with the response variable. This implies that as the lagged number of US military trainees increases, the response variable, terrorism casualties, tends to increase as well. The US military trainees of the previous year will affect future terrorism casualties. The most significant findings from Table 2 are the coefficients of lagged dependent variable terrorism casualties, lagged military aid, and lagged US military trainees. The lagged dependent variable captures the history that influences current terrorism casualties in the dynamic panel model.

Terrorism Casualties	System GMM
Lag Terrorism Casualties	0.460*** (18.66)
Lag Military aid	0.000000333** (2.94)
Lag Security interventions	-61.11(-1.01)
Lag Humanitarian interventions	144.6 (1.34)
Lag US troops	0.118 (0.83)
Lag US military trainees	0.0722*** (6.46)
Total oil imports	-0.00332***(-10.20)
GDP Annual Growth Rate	1.655 (1.03)
GDP Per Capita	0.103*** (5.78)
Total Population	0.00000881*** (10.20)
Maternal Mortality	0.229 (1.84)
Democracy	-61.27(-1.03)
_cons	-492.9***
N	756
Number of Groups	49
Number of Instruments	318
T Statistics in parentheses
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 2: Lagged Dependent and Lagged Independent Variables Predicting Terrorism Casualties in Africa, 1995-2020

Empirical Results of Civil Wars and Discussion

Table 3 displays the results of the response variable civil war in the dynamic panel model. The coefficients on the independent variables, security interventions, and US military trainees, are statistically significant. Security intervention records a positive coefficient of 0.147 with a p-value less than 0.05. This shows a positive association between civil war and security interventions, implying that as security interventions increase in Africa, civil war also increases. In addition, US military trainees have a positive coefficient of 0.0000353 and a p-value <0.01. This correlates with the US military trainees and the African Civil War. This implies that as US military trainees increase, civil war also increases. The lagged dependent variable in the dynamic model also has a positive coefficient of 0.129, statistically significant at p < 0.001. This explains that an increase in the lagged dependent variable leads to an increase in the response variable. Therefore, a correlation exists between both variables. This means that US foreign policy or events from previous years affected civil wars  and continue to influence current civil wars on the continent. Table 3 discusses the positive coefficients on security interventions and US military trainees, as well as the role of the lagged dependent variable in the dynamic panel model. I hypothesized that the higher the number of US security interventions in an African country, the greater the likelihood of civil war in that country. Empirical evidence supports/confirms the hypothesis in the model. The most significant findings from the empirical results are the independent variables with positive coefficients and statistical significance in the dynamic panel data model. The empirical evidence shows that US security interventions in African countries affect civil wars. For example, the US security intervention on the continent has become profound after the 9/11 global war on terror. The US created several counterterrorism programs on the continent, and these initiatives might influence civil wars in some African countries. However, the strength of the association between US security interventions and civil wars is weak. A strong correlation exists between the US military trainees and civil wars on the continent. This might be due to an increase in US training of African militaries to neutralize violent extremist organizations such as Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Shabaab in the volatile regions of Africa. I hypothesized that the higher the number of US military trainees in an African country, the greater the likelihood of civil wars in that country. The empirical evidence supports the model's hypothesis.

Civil Wars	System GMM
Lag Civil Wars	0.129*** (4.34)
Military aid	- 1. 93e-10(-1.82)
Security interventions	0.147* (2.47)
Humanitarian interventions	-0.0854(-0.76)
US troops	0.000238 (1.69)
US military trainees	0.0000353** (3.06)
Total oil imports	-0.00000178***(-5.30)
GDP Annual Growth Rate	-0.00348* (-2.21)
GDP Per Capita	-0.00000229(-0.13)
Total Population	6.57e-09*** (4.66)
Maternal Mortality	-0.0000870 (-0.67)
Anocracy	-0.0223 (-0.50)
_cons	0.128
N	756
Number of Groups	49
Number of Instruments	282
T Statistics Parentheses
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

                                                                             Table 3: Predicting Civil Wars Across Africa, 1995-2020

Empirical Results of Lagged Dependent Civil Wars and Lagged Independent Variables

Table 4 shows the results of the dependent, lagged dependent, lagged independent, and control variables in the dynamic panel model. The lagged dependent variable, the civil war, is statistically significant with a positive coefficient of 0.207 and a p-value of 0.001. This indicates that as the lagged dependent variable increases, the dependent variable, the civil war, also increases in the model. The US's previous policies and events played a tremendous role in the continent's future civil wars. In addition, the lagged independent variable for US military trainee records a positive coefficient of 0.0000294 with a p-value below 0.05. This indicates a correlation between the lagged independent and dependent variables, which explains that as lagged US military trainees increase, the civil war also increases in the model. The remaining variables played no significant role in the model.

Lag US troops	0.000118 (0.82)
Lag US military trainees	0.0000294* (2.94)
Total oil imports	-0.00000139*** (-3.90)
GDP Annual Growth Rate	-0.00370* (-2.44)
GDP Per Capita	-0.0000212 (-1.24)
Total Population	8.17e-09*** (5.06)
Maternal Mortality	-0.0000420 (-0.32)
Anocracy	-0.00426 (-0.11)
_cons	0.109
N	1.11
Number of Groups	756
Number of Instruments	49
T Statistics in Parentheses	297
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

                             Table 4: Lagged Dependent and Independent Variables Predicting Civil Wars in Africa, 1995-2020

Empirical Results of Coups and Discussion Table 5 displays the empirical results for the dependent variable, coups, and the independent variables.

US military aid records a positive coefficient of 2.84 and is statistically significant, with a p-value below 0.01. This shows a correlation between coups and military aid on the continent. This implies that coups have also increased as the US has increased its military aid to some African countries. The security intervention independent variable in the dynamic model also has a positive coefficient of 0.0947 and is statistically significant, with a p-value below 0.05. Although the relationship is less intense, a correlation between the two variables has been observed. It can be interpreted that as US security interventions increase in Africa, coups also increase. The model focuses only on statistically significant variables that have a tremendous impact on US foreign policy on the continent. These are military aid and security interventions. Empirical evidence indicates that a strong relationship exists between US military aid and coups on the continent.

Coups	System GMM
Lag Coups	-0.151*** (-4.59)
Military aid	2.84e-10** (2.98)
Security interventions	0.0947* (2.14)
Humanitarian interventions	0.0355 (0.39)
US troops	-0.0000193 (-0.20)
US military trainees	0.00000444 (0.51)
Total oil imports	-0.00000166** (-3.07)
GDP Annual Growth Rate	-0.000634(-0.56)
GDP Per Capita	0.0000292* (2.09)
Total Population	-7.87e-09***(-4.36)
Maternal Mortality	0.000165 (1.57)
Anocracy	-0.00716(-0.22)
_cons	0.0927
N	(1.11)
Number of Groups	756
Number of Instruments	49
T Statistics Parentheses	173
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

                                                                          Table 5: Predicting Coups Across Africa, 1995-2020

Empirical Results of Lagged Dependent Coup and Lagged Independent Variables

Table 6 reports empirical results on the dependent variable coup, statistically significant lagged independent and control variables in the dynamic panel model. The lagged independent variable, US military aid, records a positive coefficient of 3.82 and is statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.001. The positive coefficient indicates a correlation between the lagged independent variable (military aid) and the response variable (coup). This implies that an increase in the previous military aid affects current coups on the continent. Other lagged independent variables in the model are insignificant and played no essential role in the coup response variable.

Coups	System GMM
Lag Coups	-0.229*** (-7.36)
Lag military aid	3.82e-10*** (3.97)
Lag security interventions	-0.0406 (-0.91)
Lag humanitarian interventions	0.0205 (0.24)
Lag US troops	-0.0000681 (-0.69)
Lag US military trainees	0.00000295 (0.34)
Total oil imports	-0.00000134* (-2.43)
GDP Annual Growth Rate	-0.000766 (-0.68)
GDP Per Capita	0.0000209 (1.65)
Total Population	-6.13e-09*** (-3.38)
Maternal Mortality	0.0000332 (0.31)
Anocracy	0.0418 (1.38)
_cons	0.116
N	(1.41)
Number of Groups	756
Number of Instruments	49
T Statistics Parentheses	179
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

                                 Table 6: Lagged Dependent and Lagged Independent Variables Predicting Coups Across Africa, 1995-2020

Empirical Results of Anti-Government Demonstrations and Discussion

Table 7 reports the empirical results of anti-government demonstrations and independent and lagged dependent variables in the dynamic panel data model. The independent variables are insignificant and have no direct influence on anti-government protests on the continent. This means the US foreign policy in Africa did not affect/influence anti-government demonstrations. The variables are insignificant in the model because anti- government protests in many African countries are caused by poverty, corruption, economic inequality, inflation, and unemployment, which are not linked to US foreign policy. For example, research conducted by Harris and Hern 2019 identified economic conditions, poor government service delivery, low wages, and electoral malpractices as drivers of protests in Africa.

GDP Per Capita	-0.0000134 (-0.56)
Total oil imports	-5.30e-09* (-2.45)
Maternal Mortality	-0.0000977 (-0.52)
Democracy	-0.0709 (-8.89)
_cons	0.690***
N	(5.28)
Number of Groups	756
Number of Instruments	49
T Statistics in Parentheses	261
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

                                                                  Table 7: Predicting Anti-Government Demonstrations Across Africa, 1995-2020

Empirical Results of Dependent, Lagged Dependent, and Lagged Independent Variables

Table 8 presents the empirical results for the anti-government demonstrations, lagged dependent variables, lagged independent variables, and control variables in the dynamic panel data model. The lagged US military aid variable has a positive coefficient of 3.46 and is statistically significant, with a p-value below 0.05. This shows that the US increase in military assistance from the previous year affects anti-government demonstrations on the continent today. The model's other lagged independent variables have played no significant role in the protests.

Anti-Government Demonstrations	System GMM
Lag antigovernment demonstrations	0.0368 (1.21)
Lag military aid	3.46e-10* (2.02)
Lag security interventions	0.116 (1.32)
Lag humanitarian interventions	0.0841 (0.51)
Lag US troops	-0.0000210 (-0.14)
Lag US military trainees	-0.000036 (-1.84)
Total oil imports	-0.00000126 (-1.78)
GDP Annual Growth Rate	0.00118 (0.56)
GDP Per Capita	-0.00000941 (-0.42)
Total Population	-3.39e-09 (-1.55)
Maternal Mortality	-0.000313 (-1.75)
Democracy	0.0783 (1.16)
_cons	0.686***
N	(5.46)
Number of Groups	756
Number of Instruments	49
T Statistics in Parentheses	280
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

 Table 8: Lagged Dependent and Lagged Independent Variables Predicting Anti-Government Demonstrations Across Africa, 1995-2020

Conclusion

In summary, the use of the Arellano-Bover 1995 and Blundell-Bond 1998 system generalized method of moments (GMM) addressed and eliminated unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, omitted variable bias, measurement error, and simultaneity from the data, making the empirical results robust, efficient, and consistent. The study’s empirical findings from the dynamic panel data model show that US troops, security interventions, military aid, and US military trainees have influenced US foreign policy militarization on the continent.

The paper supports some of the study's hypotheses. For example, I hypothesized that the more US troops deployed in an African country, the higher the chance of terrorism casualties there.

The empirical evidence confirms this hypothesis. However, the correlation between US troops in Africa and increased terrorism casualties does not mean causation, as correlation does not imply causality. Other factors could be influencing the association, such as the instability of security conditions in the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa. Examples include Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab, and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin. Despite the correlation between terrorism casualties and US troop deployments in Africa, nothing proves that one causes the other.

The statistical analysis also supports the hypothesis that the higher the amount of US military aid to an African country, the greater the likelihood of civil wars in that country. The connection between US military aid and civil war does not prove causation. Several factors could explain the positive relationship. For example, changes in US foreign policy after 9/11 played a role. The US increased security assistance to many countries supporting the global war on terror, and at the same time, the focus on Africa’s poverty, underdevelopment, failed states, and ungoverned spaces—once seen mainly through a humanitarian lens—is now viewed as a security threat and a sanctuary for terrorist groups. In this context, the US intervenes directly in Africa by establishing many counterterrorism programs aimed at winning over violent extremist groups. This may explain the correlation, but it does not prove causation.

Furthermore, the empirical evidence confirms two key hypotheses in the study. I hypothesized that the more US military trainees in an African country, the higher the chance of civil war there. This link between US military trainees and civil war does not prove causation. As explained above, the significant shift in US foreign policy after the attacks led to an increase in US military training programs for African armies through counterterrorism efforts to fight terrorist groups. While this increase might influence civil wars in the region, it is not proven to be the cause. I also hypothesized that the more US military trainees in an African country, the higher the chance of coups. The empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. However, the link between US training of military officers and coups in African countries does not prove that US training caused the coups. Other factors may be involved, as correlation does not equal causation. For example, coups in Africa are often caused by government mismanagement, corruption, electoral fraud, inequality, high living costs, and violations of democratic norms. US training programs aim to promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and civilian control over the military. Although US-trained officers have staged coups in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea, and Niger, this does not prove causality. The militarization of US policy in Africa has achieved tactical successes against violent extremist groups, but it has also led to adverse side effects like weakened governance and regional instability. A renewed approach should focus on development, with diplomacy playing a key role in tackling the root causes of conflict and building sustainable peace across the continent.

Future studies should evaluate US foreign policy by focusing on a specific geographic region in Africa, such as the Horn of Africa or the Sahel. Additionally, the US should continue to promote democratic norms and economic development in Africa, rather than prioritizing political and security-centric programs. In summary, the empirical evidence supports several of the hypotheses, and for those that did not validate my propositions, I leave their analysis to future research [1-24].

References

1. Piper, A. (2023). What does dynamic panel analysis tell us about life satisfaction?. Review of Income and Wealth, 69(2), 376-394.
2. Marc, A. (2021, August). years after 9/11, Jihadi terrorism rises in Africa.
3. Bob, Wekesa., & Siviwe, Rikhtso. (2021). 9/11 and Africa: Reflecting on Two Decades of US-Africa Policies and Interests.
4. Wiley, D. (2012). Militarizing Africa and African studies and the US Africanist response. African Studies Review, 55(2), 147-161.
5. Daniel, Volman. (2009). US Militarization Programs in Africa,Current African Issues 43.
6. Conteh-Morgan, E. (2019). Militarization and securitization in Africa. Insight Turkey, 21(1), 77-94.
7. Halcomb, E. J., & Hickman, L. (2015). Mixed methods research. Faculty of Science, Medicine and Health-Papers: part A.
8. Schmidt, E. (2018). Foreign intervention in Africa after the cold war: Sovereignty, responsibility, and the war on terror. Ohio University Press.
9. Lieberman, E. S. (2005). Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative research. American political science review, 99(3), 435-452.
10. George, Klay. Kieh. Jr. (2009). The State of Political Instability in Africa, Journal of Developing Societies, 25(1), 1-25.
11. Campbell, H. G. (2017). The United States and security in Africa: The impact of the military management of the international system. Africa Development, 42(3), 45-71.
12. Jennifer, Cooke. (2013). US Engagement in Africa.
13. Keenan, J. (2008). US militarization in Africa: What anthropologists should know about AFRICOM. Anthropology Today, 24(5), 16-20.
14. De Arimatéia da Cruz, J., & Stephens, L. K. (2010). The US Africa command (AFRICOM): Building partnership or neo- colonialism of US-Africa relations?. Journal of Third World Studies, 27(2), 193-213.
15. Ploch, L. (2010). Africa Command: US strategic interests and the role of the US military in Africa. Diane Publishing.
16. Louise, Doyle., Anne-Marie, Brady., & Gobnait, Byrne. (2009). An Overview of Mixed Methods Research, Journal of Research in Nursing, 14(2), 175-185.
17. Allen, N. D. (2018). Assessing a decade of US military strategy in Africa. Orbis, 62(4), 655-669.
18. Van de Walle, N. (2010). US policy towards Africa: The Bush  legacy  and  the  Obama  administration.  African Affairs, 109(434), 1-21.
19. Abrahamsen, R. (2005). Blair's Africa: the politics of securitization and fear. Alternatives, 30(1), 55-80.
20. Johnson, R. B., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come. Educational researcher, 33(7), 14-26.
21. Salih, Booker., & Temi, Ibirogba. (2019). The Militarization of US Policy Towards Africa.
22. Dawadi, S., Shrestha, S., & Giri, R. A. (2021). Mixed- methods research: A discussion on its types, challenges, and criticisms. Journal of Practical Studies in Education, 2(2), 25-36.
23. Magu, S. M. (2018). Great powers and US foreign policy towards Africa. In Great Powers and US Foreign Policy towards Africa (pp. 171-185). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
24. Miles, W. F. (2012). Deploying development to counter terrorism: Post-9/11 transformation of US foreign aid to Africa. African Studies Review, 55(3), 27-60.

Foot notes

1. 1. Peter J. Schraeder (1993). Reviewing the study of US policy towards Africa: From intellectual ‘backwater’ to theory construction, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4, 775-786
   2. Elizabeth Schmidt (2018). Foreign Intervention in Africa afterthe Cold War
2. 3. Ibid
   4. Lauren Ploch (2011). African Command. US Strategic Interests and the Role of the US Military in Africa
   5. Nathaniel D.F. Allen (2018). Assessing a Decade of US Military Strategy in Africa, Foreign Policy Research Institute
   6. Elizabeth Schmidt (2018). Foreign Intervention in Africa afterthe Cold War.
3. 7. Kentstateuniversitypress.com/ wp-content/ uploads/ symposium/Nieman/Concept_of _democracy.htm
   8. Salih Booker and Temi Ibirogba (2019). The Militarization of US Policy Towards Africa
   9. Ibid
   10. Stephen Magu (2019). Great Powers and US Foreign Policy Towards Africa, Springer International Publishing.
   11. Ibid
   12. Horace Campbell (2017). The United States and Security in Africa: The Impact of the Military Management of International System, Africa Development, Vol. 42, No. 3, 45-71
4. 13. Elizabeth Schmidt (2018). Foreign Intervention in Africa afterthe Cold War
5. 14. Horace Campbell (2017). The United States and Security in Africa: The Impact of the Military Management of International System, Africa Development, Vol. 42, No. 3, 45-71.
6. 15. George Klay Kieh Jr. (2009). The State of Political Instability in Africa, Journal of Developing Societies, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1-25
   16. Nicolas Van De Walle (2009). US Policy Towards Africa: The Bush Legacy and Obama Administration, African Affairs, Vol. 109, No. 434, 1-21
   17. UStr.org
   18. Jose de Arimateia Cruz and Laura Stephens (2010). TheUS Command and AFRICOM: Building Partnership or Neocolonialism of US-Africa Relations, Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. 107, No. 426, 111-120
7. 19. Jeremy Keena (2008). US Militarization in Africa: What Anthropologists should know about AFRICOM, Anthropology Today, Vol. 24, No. 5
   20. Daniel Volman (2009). US Militarization Programs in Africa, Current African Issues 43
   21. Ibid
   22. Ibid
   23. David Wiley (2012). Militarizing Africa and African Studies and the US Africanist Response, African Studies Review, Vol. 55, No. 2, 147-161
   24. Earl Conteh-Morgan (2019). Militarization and Securitization in Africa: A Scramble for Africa? The Role of Great and Emerging Powers, Insight Turkey, Vol. 21, No. 1, 77-94
   25. Jennifer Cooke (2013). US Engagement in Africa
   26. Alexander Marc (2021). Twenty Years After 9/11, Jihadi Terrorism Rises in Africa
   27. Bob Wekesa & Siviwe Rikhtso (2021). 9/11 and Africa: Reflecting on Two Decades of US-Africa Policies and Interests
   28. Nathaniel D.F. Allen (2018). Assessing a Decade of US Military Strategy in Africa, Foreign Policy Research Institute
   29. Rita Abrahamsen (2005). Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear, Alternative: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 30, No. 1, 55-80
   30. Ibid
   31. Louise Doyle, Anne-Marie Brady & Gobnait Byrne (2009). An Overview of Mixed-Methods Research, Journal of Research in Nursing, Vol. 14, No. 2, 175-185
   32. Elizabeth Halcomb & Louise Hickman (2015). Mixed Methods Research, Faculty of Science, Medicine, and Health Papers Part A. 2656
   33. R. Burke Johnson & Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie (2004). Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come, Sage Journal Vol. 33, Issue 7
   34. Saraswati Dawadi (2021). Mixed Methods Research: A Discussion on Its Types, Challenges, and Criticisms, Journal of Practical Studies in Education, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 25-36 
   35. Evan Lieberman (2005). Nested Analysis as A Mixed Method Strategy for Comparative Research, American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No.
   36. Alan Piper (2022). What Does Dynamic Panel Analysis Tell Us About Life Satisfaction? Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, No. 0
   37. Scribbr.com/methodology/control-variable/