Socio-Economic Implications of Boko Haram Operations in Nigeria

Introduction

The uprising of Boko Haram (BH) has grown and manifested into more violent and radicalized over time. The rebellion of the group is still wreaking devastation, particularly in the country’s north. The population of dwellers residing in those areas inflicted by BH have noticeably decreased. This is evident by many houses being burnt by fire, abandoned, blood spillage, streets turning desert, tears amidst the aged concerning the loss of their loved ones, the presence of regional and international organisations in some regions, and the high presence of security officials. According to Falilusi (2019), northern Nigeria is now regarded as one of the most dangerous and economically underdeveloped regions in the country. BH’s ongoing bombings and attacks have had detrimental effects on the political and socioeconomic spheres. As a result, this study dwelled on the review of socioeconomic literature on the Boko Haram uprising, as it caused unemployment, inadequate and poor healthcare, poverty, illiteracy, political instability, national insecurity, and corruption [1].

Since its actions became widely known in 2009, the rebel organization Boko Haram has achieved several synchronized attacks against numerous institutions and the Nigerian States [2]. These attacks have hurt the socio-political and economic growth of the country. This group’s actions have caused the northeastern area of Nigeria to suffer from the deliberate devastation of people, property, and the economy. The intended consequences were also felt at the subregional and regional levels [3]. Numerous experts have voiced concern that these concerns not only jeopardize the image and existence of Nigeria in the corporate and business world but gravely jeopardize several sub-regional and regional organizations throughout the continent.

Regional and sub-regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among others, face formidable challenges. Their main responsibility is to guarantee member state cooperation and integration in areas and aspects that will promote long-lasting peace and development, and to jointly address issues that could endanger the region, among other studies, have all suggested the prerequisites for the formation of BH, which include maladministration, bad governance, prevailing injustice, and social inequality that has to be in existence for a long time [4-8]. Others are instrumentation of violence (mostly a religious issue) by the northern elites, extreme poverty and hunger despite the country’s richness in natural resources, prevailing corruption, increasing unemployment, and illiteracy, among others [2,6-8].

In the fight against the BH uprising most especially as it affects other northern countries that share a border with Nigeria, regional security was formed. This was also a result of the fact that the Nigerian government finds it difficult to tame the activities of this group as they flee into other countries. The impact of regional security in fighting this group across borders could also have socio-economic impacts on the northern dwellers. Therefore, this study aims to critically analyze the socioeconomic effects of the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria. This is done to critically examine and analyze the concerns created by the effects of the Boko-Haram uprising on several socioeconomic indices, such as poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, poor healthcare, and displacement. This study dwells on the works of literature and reports from newspapers and journals on the subject matter.

Literature Review

Socio-Economic Implications

It has been nearly 13 years since BH turned violent, and the Nigerian government has not been able to neutralize the organization or adequately defend its citizens from its attacks. It is becoming more challenging for the nation to recover socially and economically from previous devastation due to Boko Haram’s ongoing uprising. Nigerians, particularly those in the north, no longer feel secure in their nation [9]. The nation continues to suffer from the sect’s terror acts, which include kidnappings, bombings, looting, and killings of people. The socioeconomic status of the people living in the north has also significantly declined [10].

Poverty and Scarcity

To start, this section’s knowledge will be aided with a quick definition. According to Ngbea and Achunike (2014), the word “poor” denotes a lack of specific tangible possessions and money [11]. The UN defines poverty as a “denial of choice and opportunities, a violation of human dignity, [which] deprives one of the basic capacity [needed] to participate effectively in society,” which is a more restrictive definition [12].

The fact that over half of people on Earth are unable to actively engage in their community because they lack access to fundamental resources is depressing. In Nigeria, poverty is a significant societal issue, particularly in the north of the nation [1,11]. More than half of the population still makes less than $1 per day (â?¦1200 as of October 2023) despite the nation’s economic strength and recent progress.

Given that Nigeria is known to be among the thriving economies in Africa, it is unclear why over 50% of its people live in poverty. This is because a few people from the economic elite class business moguls, politicians, entertainers, etc. own the majority of the country’s wealth. Despite Nigeria’s claim to be “the largest African economy”, it continues to rank among the nations with the worst rates of poverty worldwide [13].

Nigeria is regarded as Africa’s top producer of crude oil, and its burgeoning agriculture industry helps to fuel the country’s economic expansion. However, poverty is still a major issue in the nation. Nigeria still massively depends on importing it majority of its food, even though the country’s agricultural industry accounts for around 45% of its GDP, as stated by Ngbea and Achunike (2014) [11]. For instance, the nation produced an estimated 3.7 million metric tons of rice domestically in 2018; but, an additional 5 million metric tons were imported [14]. Nigeria’s large population and consequent food shortfall can be ascribed to the country’s substantial imports of agricultural products.

To top it all off, Nigeria’s poverty rate has risen due to the Boko Haram uprising, particularly in the country’s north. Since Boko Haram started operating actively in 2002, the rate of poverty has sharply grown. Over 60 million Nigerians were predicted to be living on less than $1 per day by 2012 [15]. In Nigeria, approximately ninety-one million people were considered to be living in severe poverty as of January 2019 [16,17]. Given that rice and cattle production in Nigeria are mostly centred on the northern area, the ongoing attacks by Boko Haram have impacted the locals’ capacity to maintain these industries. In 2018, for instance, grain output decreased from 3.8 million hectares to 6.9 million hectares in 2017 [14].

The majority of Boko Haram assaults involve the looting of communities, the theft of agricultural goods by intruders, and the forcible removal of cattle from their owners [9]. For instance, three tiny villages in Bornu state were assaulted by a Boko Haram detachment in September 2018 [10]. It brutally forced the inhabitants of Dala-Melari, Femari and Fuguri villages to give up their food and animals and set fire to people’s homes and farm yards [18].

Due to the theft of their livestock and farm products, the incident resulted in the deaths of at least 7 persons and the displacement of over 100 others [18]. Boko Haram is not the only group that has engaged in theft. Another instance of looting occurred in Adamawa state sometime in March 2019, when rebels ransacked a bank and a few nearby businesses. Thankfully, several of the robbers were killed when the state police launched a counterattack [19].

The only possessions that the fugitives managed to take with them were food since Nigerian police officers responding to an attack alert discovered and arrested the people in possession of the money. Because of the ongoing loss of revenue and means of livelihood, BH’s operations have not only negatively impacted output but have also increased poverty in the area [1,10]. Considering that the northern region of Nigeria was already well-known for having a high percentage of poverty, the rise of the BH uprising has made matters worse. Human insecurity is a result of the BH uprising’s ongoing effects on poverty, which include things like inadequate nutrition, a lack of access to high- quality healthcare and education, a rise in youth delinquency, etc [6,20].

The northerners are left to make do with the meagre food that remains after crops are destroyed and looted. Furthermore, the majority of the time, the meagre food that is left for the populace has low nutritional value, which exacerbates malnutrition and diet-related illnesses. For instance, Nigeria’s greatest rates of malnutrition were found in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states which are now most impacted by the BH uprising [21]. The aforementioned states are experiencing an increasing food shortfall as a result of Boko Haram’s ongoing attacks and threats. As a result, individuals do not have enough access to a balanced diet or enough food to sustain themselves [20].

In contrast to other regions of the nation, children in the northern states particularly Adamawa, Bornu and Yobe states suffer from severe or acute malnutrition, with no indication that the government would provide any support [21]. To make matters worse, a large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) that were formerly located in the north have fled out of fear for their lives [20]. This is because the cult may target its organizations in addition to kidnapping employees for ransom to raise more money for its cause.

Over time, kidnappings have become more common in northern Nigeria, with Westerners being the main targets. As a result, the economic strength of the north has also been impacted by the fact that international enterprises and organizations are departing the region. Due to the detrimental impact on employment creation and opportunity availability, their relocation has resulted in a rise in poverty rates [20].

Due to the employment that international firms created, the people in the northern portion of Nigeria were able to maintain a high level of living and pay for services like healthcare and education. As a result, international enterprises made a significant contribution to the livelihoods of the local population. International companies were not just impacted in the north; Nigeria as a whole has lost a significant amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a result of political unrest in the nation [22]. The country’s FDI inflows were reported to have decreased by around 21.3% in 2013 [22].

Given that foreign direct investment (FDI) has a considerable influence on economic growth in Nigeria, the decline in FDI inflow over time hurts the nation’s growth. For instance, FDI was over $3000 million in the fourth quarter of 2012; however, it has since sharply decreased, with just over $300 million in FDI in 2018 [23]. As a result of the Boko Haram uprising in northern Nigeria, poverty and illiteracy are related.

Illiteracy

Poverty causes illiteracy, and vice versa. In comparison to other regions of the country, northern Nigeria has not just a greater proportion of poverty, but also the highest rate of illiteracy [24]. According to a UNICEF study from 2019, the ongoing attacks by Boko Haram in Adamawa, Bornu and Yobe states have left over 60% of youngsters in northern Nigeria illiterate. Northern Nigeria has a lower quality of education than other sections of the country due to the region’s heavy emphasis on livestock husbandry and agricultural output [25].

However, many school buildings have been damaged since the founding of BH and subsequent attacks in the area. There are thus fewer schools available. Bombing schools is one of BH’s strategies because it is believed that education from the West is hurting people and making it harder for it to attract new members for its group. Because there are fewer schools, there are more young people for Boko Haram to influence, which gives the group the chance to grow. The bombing of schools has also deeply frightened many.

Because they worry that their kids will be murdered or abducted while they are at school, parents are afraid to take their kids there [26]. While most parents are not academically qualified to homeschool their children, others may want to do so. They thereby transmit their "illiteracy" through this procedure. Additionally, when more pupils miss school because they fear being killed or abducted, they lose the chance to study, which raises their illiteracy and contributes to the low literacy rates in the area.

As implied by its name “Boko Haram”, the group’s main claim is that Western "education is a sin," which is why it opposes enlightenment and education. Its actions, such as the abduction of students and the devastation of educational institutions, have made this clear [26]. It’s common knowledge that education is an effective tool. The group knows this as well, which is why it is making every effort to ensure that education has no effect within its borders. One illustration of this is the significant kidnappings that the sect carried out in the 2014 Chibok schoolgirl case.

Without proper policing, and public and private stakeholders’ involvement in the fight against BH, the terrorist organization were able to successfully assault and abduct 276 students in a female school [27,28]. Millions of people worldwide launched a campaign in response to this incident, pleading with the authorities to assist in the girls’ return. Nevertheless, over 100 of the females have not returned more than five years later. This comes after about 111 females managed to flee the Boko Haram region. People’s dread was aroused by this specific kidnapping, and as a result, parents pulled their girls from school. Some received home education, while others were married off at quite young ages.

A comparable incident happened in 2018, not quite five years after the kidnapping, in the northern Nigerian town of Dapchi, when over one hundred schoolgirls vanished on February 19 [26]. When the Nigerian military force set out to rescue the girls, two of them were murdered, 76 were let free, and the other females have not yet been located or released [29]. Lastly, the goal of Boko Haram’s kidnapping technique is to keep the inhabitants of the north illiterate by making sure they do not pursue education. This is done to facilitate the manipulation of the populace into endorsing the beliefs and objectives of the group [30].

They employ this tactic because, in their view, education is a means of enlightenment, a source of inspiration to put a stop to extremism, and a tactic to counter-terrorism. Therefore, it seems natural that the gang would aim to stop this from happening by capturing children and demolishing school buildings. Thus, the region’s level of illiteracy has increased as a result of this practice. Additionally, it makes it harder for people to get higher living standards, which raises the poverty rate. There is a belief that someone impoverished, illiterate, and jobless is a prime candidate for manipulation. This is accurate since Boko Haram recruits people who are educated, unemployed, and from low- income backgrounds.

Unemployment

Another consequence of the BH uprising in Nigeria is the increasing rate of unemployment in the northeast region of the nation [20]. Illiteracy and poverty are related, as was previously stated. Adding unemployment to the already existing double issue results in the triple scourge of unemployment, illiteracy, and poverty. One may argue that the Boko Haram group employs tactics that could impact all three components because they are aware of this connection. Employment prospects in the area are impacted by a series of bomb attacks on public and private educational infrastructures, its techniques for theft, and its destruction of revenue sources [20].

The high unemployment rate is caused by people lacking the educational background necessary to obtain good work, which leaves them without a means of subsistence. Lack of funding for high-quality education has an impact on one’s capacity to land high-calibre work, which exacerbates unemployment [31]. Lack of access to education, coupled with the sect’s history of demolishing schools in the area and driving some students to drop out of terror, results in a lack of employability-boosting skills. According to Tochukwu (2013) and Ikpe (2017), the threat posed by Boko Haram has resulted in the loss of companies, particularly those owned by foreign investors, due to the group’s abduction and bombing activities in the region. As a result, there are many fewer jobs available in the area [20,22].

It is now hard to find work in the northeast due to the sharp decline in job availability and the region’s growing population. Due to Boko Haram’s ongoing uprising, there are currently more individuals than there are job openings. Nigeria’s unemployment rate rose during the course of the year, reaching 23.1% by the end of 2018, with more than 50% of the country’s unemployed coming from the north, according to Trading Economics (2019) [23]. The Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) conducted a study in 2010 to ascertain the longevity of both foreign and domestic manufacturing enterprises in the nation [32].

It was found that the fear of terrorism was one of the main reasons over 100 businesses in the northern area had closed [32]. One factor contributing to the economic downturn is the current unease that businesses have toward Nigeria’s northern region. Businesses were not only losing money on their facilities but also seeing a decline in sales. This is due to a decline in their patronage rate and an increase in people’s anxiety about Boko Haram. People find it difficult to freely use such amenities in cities and villages that have been gravely affected by the Boko Haram insurrection since many businesses have gone on comatose, the period of banking operations have been reduced, and marketplaces have also been significantly disrupted [33].

The socioeconomic toll that the Boko Haram uprising has had on the northeastern population means that it will take the government longer to rebuild the area from the rubble, even once the extremist organization has been destroyed. Last but not least, the high unemployment rate in the country’s north can also be linked to the region’s expanding population and subpar healthcare facilities, which lack the means to educate the public or assist them in using family planning [34].

It is particularly challenging for the people of the north to obtain family planning information and contraception due to Boko Haram’s bombing of medical institutions in the area. Given this, the overcrowding state of the region is becoming a challenge. This brings up the socioeconomic effects of the sect’s insurrection on medical treatment in northern Nigeria.

Poor Healthcare

Boko Haram’s uprising has also had an impact on the healthcare industry, as some medical professionals have fled the state in pursuit of safer employment conditions as part of its attempt to topple the government in northern Nigeria. Thus, the region has lost competent physicians as a result of the terrorist group’s threat [35]. The region’s healthcare services have been impacted by the loss of these physicians. For instance, in 2013, there was a polio epidemic with over 50% of cases reported in Borno and Yobe. This was caused by the transfer of physicians and a shortage of healthcare resources [36].

The situation was made worse by the sect’s ongoing attacks in the area in addition to our lack of resources to contain the spread. More than 50 cases of diarrhoea were reported per week in the state of Adamawa, and there were insufficient medical resources to contain the outbreak [36]. During BH attacks, the region’s water infrastructure became contaminated; in certain cases, the terrorist organization purposefully poisoned the water to keep people from using it [34].

A measles epidemic occurred in northern Nigeria in 2015; in less than a week, over 100 cases were reported [36]. Apart from the previously mentioned health problems, malnutrition still dominates in the northern area, making it much more challenging for the populace to address the health emergency. Any form of illness is made worse by unbalanced diets, and in the case of northern Nigeria, BH’s caused food shortfall is one of the things that makes disease outbreaks worse [34].

In addition, there are a lot of refugees because of the BH uprising. This has made the already overburdened healthcare system in the camps even more [10,37]. Furthermore, illnesses are easily transmitted because of the unsafe and unhygienic actions of camp staff as well as refugees. According to Awojobi (2014), the Boko Haram uprising has complicated the distribution of HIV therapy throughout the area [9].

The northeastern region of Nigeria has the second lowest documented HIV rate in the nation (1.1%), however, despite this, the region lacks access to proper treatment [37-39]. In the past, Borno state led the northeastern area in the usage of antiretroviral therapy (ART). But between 2013 and 2016, the BH uprising caused the coverage of ART to decline from 41.2% to 18% [38]. The quantity of patients receiving therapy has been impacted by this decrease [37].

Displacement

Many individuals have been forced to flee their homes in the northern region of Nigeria due to the Boko Haram uprising. The growth in displaced people and the development of refugee crises in the country’s north are two of the main effects of the sect’s rebellion [40]. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2019), it was revealed that there have been reports of relocation since Boko Haram's formation in 2002 and their launch of attack in 2009 which resulted in deadly assaults against the inhabitants of the north. The northern region has 1.9 million displaced individuals as of October 2015, and more than 3 million persons displaced between 2016 to 2018 [37,41,42].

After the cult abducted the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and attacked nearby communities in the same year and the next year, there was an increase in the number of displaced persons in many northern Nigerian states. According to records, Boko Haram’s actions forced nearly a million people to leave their homes in Maiduguri, which was supposed to be the safest region of Borno state [41]. Additionally, according to Abdulazeez (2016), there were around 134,000 internally displaced persons in Yobe State and 135,000 internally displaced people in Adamawa State in 2015 [41].

The economic impact of displacement is significant in northern Nigeria. Due to either the insurgent group’s destruction of dwellings or the sect’s dread of it, there are fewer individuals in the area to conduct everyday socioeconomic operations. In addition, individuals run from farmyards where produce and cattle are plundered. Due to the lack of a means of subsistence, the losses additionally make it difficult for the victims of the assaults to return to their homes and towns. The rise of refugees from northern Nigeria to regions of central and west Africa was caused by displacement; many of these individuals were compelled to seek sanctuary in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger [42].

More than 100,000 refugees were being hosted in Cameroon as of January 2019, more than 50,000 in Chad, and over 200,000 in Niger [42]. Comparing this to the number of refugees documented in 2015 roughly 70,000 in all three countries it is clear that there has been a significant rise [41]. Thus, the rise in less than five years from 2015 has exceeded a hundred per cent. This is because the Boko Haram uprising has gotten stronger over the last five years. The number of bombings, looting, rapes, and kidnappings has increased, forcing individuals from the impacted areas to flee for their lives.

Due to their lack of the economic clout that Nigeria possesses, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have seen severe economic setbacks as a result of the influx of refugees [43]. Humanitarian aid has been drawn to displacement over the years, but circumstances in refugee camps remain subpar, as seen, for instance, by reports of illness outbreaks and a lack of food and basic supplies [44].

For instance, since the camp in Cameroon opened its doors in 2013, its population has increased by almost 200% over its initial start-up size and planned capacity [44]. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), along with the Cameroonian government, assumed responsibility for camp maintenance after it became apparent that the government lacked the necessary skills to manage and keep the camp [43,44]. Although UNHCR is in charge of supplying food, tents, medical attention, clothes, and necessities for the camp, the inflow of migrants has presented challenges for them. Refugee camp conditions have deteriorated as a result of their struggles to supply enough supplies [44].

In 2015, Cameroon and Chad were forced to begin returning some refugees to Nigeria due to a shortage of resources in the camps. This presented more difficulties for the returnees because there was no safe place for them to live in Nigeria and the region they had fled was still dangerous [41]. The people that were sent back were internally displaced in the country’s north.

In addition to forcing people to flee their homes and become refugees as a result of their operations, BH also assaults camps housing refugees, which exacerbates the issue of human insecurity [42]. In 2015, refugee processing centres in northern Nigeria scrutinized newly arrived migrants closely because some of them had ties to the militant organization. The camps, already beset by the fallout from their attack, lost security as a result of possible rebel strikes. To make people leave the humanitarian camps as well, the rebel group loots them and destroys part of their supplies [41]. In summary, this places a significant socioeconomic strain on Nigeria and the host nations of the refugees.

Not only does the BH uprising have detrimental effects on the socioeconomic landscape, but its socioeconomic ramifications also foster the organization’s expansion. This is because the northern region of Nigeria is already confronted with several socioeconomic challenges, which the Boko Haram uprising has exacerbated. BH, cognizant of the socioeconomic conditions in the north, has taken advantage of this fact by manipulating the populace into backing the group and brainwashing those who lack the knowledge to recognize it as a dangerous organization. Additionally, Boko Haram was able to establish itself in the north due to the extreme poverty there when it first began as a humanitarian organization before evolving into a terrorist organization.

Theoretical Review

This study dwells on the rationale behind the challenges facing the regional security forces that collaborated to fight against the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria and other northern countries that share northern borders with Nigeria. The theory used to explain this rationale is the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT).

To conceptually and analytically examine security, threats, and threat perception in a geographically structured manner, Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver developed the RSCT. This theory is a combination of constructive and materialist narration based on the threat ideas across several stages, as well as defining the processes that define security cooperation among actors in the global system [45]. The impact of dangers that extend beyond traditional state lines and into other regions is also examined by the RSCT.

Given the scope and intensity of the insurgent group’s activities, which extend beyond the borders of Nigeria and into other nations, the RSCT is used here to explain how the regional actors can come together to consistently counter the threat posed by BH. The theory offers a clear theoretical framework through which to analyze sub-regional security cooperation, particularly counterterrorism initiatives aimed at containing the extremist Boko-Haram group’s operations. According to Comolli (2015), these players must work together on a regional, sub-regional, and national level to analyze any counterinsurgent operation aimed at quelling the Boko Haram rebellion [46].

This is because Boko Haram’s actions now not only represent a grave danger to Nigeria’s security but also raise complicated issues for regional security. Because the “War on Terror” needs some impression of collaboration and alliances to be feasible, this existential reality needs the assistance of other global, regional, and sub-regional entities in Africa. There are numerous works of Literature on Boko Haram and its challenges in Nigeria including the subregional cooperation within the ECOWAS sub- region, aside from the theoretical underpinnings of both the RSCT and Boko Haram.

Empirical Review

A critical examination of the Boko Haram uprising within the framework of Nigeria’s burgeoning democracy was undertaken by Akinbi (2015)[47]. This point of view highlights the significant political consequences that the insurgent group’s actions have for Nigeria’s democracy and, to a lesser degree, the subregion of West Africa. According to Adelaja and George (2019), another narrative looks at how the Boko Haram phenomenon came to be perceived by the Nigerian government as exclusively a domestic security concern [49]. They argue that the insensitivity of Nigeria’s government and security forces allowed the Boko Haram group’s pattern and trend to spread to other parts of the country and its neighbouring states, requiring the ECOWAS community to take more proactive measures to ensure that the group’s operations are curbed.

Bappah et al. (2016) conducted a study on the barriers to regional cooperation in West Africa, namely in the battle against the Boko-Haram uprising in Nigeria [50]. This is also similar to the study of Botha and Abdile (2019) who found plausible factors hindering sub-regional security cooperation in counterinsurgent operations against the group included the lack of a well-defined security policy and framework to address the threat, the lack of political will and commitment from member states to ensure the group’s activities are contained, and the absence of an operational strategy and standby force [51].

Other research has documented the effects of the Boko Haram uprising on various societal levels and sectors, as well as the different regional and sub-regional responses by these actors in containing the threats posed by the group’s ongoing presence and activities [37,52].

The efforts of Oyewole (2015) and Ojelade (2018) to confront the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria were also studied [53,54]. The purpose of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTJF) is to fight the uprising of Boko Haram. These stories and research emphasized the contribution played by the Nigerian government and, most all, the involvement of regional powers such as the AU and ECOWAS. Studies by Albert (2017), Obamamoye (2017), Adeniran and Owoeye (2018) and others were carried out on the MNTJF’s operations against the Boko Haram uprising [37,55,56].

Boko Haram and National Security

Numerous studies, including those by Ogbuehl (2018), Oriola and Akinola (2018), and others, have demonstrated how the Boko Haram actions have had a detrimental impact on the “Islamic identity”. According to Beydoun (2018), this is because of the way the group operates, which involves employing certain Islamic incantations and chants, including “Allahu Akbar,” which roughly translates to “God is the greatest,” to carry out the majority of assaults. The fact that the term is mostly used to denote triumph or Allah’s protection when these extreme jihadi groups carry out their activities gives many people a violent, unpleasant, and inaccurate impression of Islam [57-59].

As a result, many claim that by using these chants as a tactic to create fear and dread in people, these extremist organizations consistently depict Islam as a violent religion [60]. Nwigwe (2019) makes another addition in which she claims that Boko Haram’s clothing choices create and cultivate a certain unfavourable perception in people’s hearts and minds [61]. Data demonstrating that Boko Haram terrorists are increasingly wearing “head-gear, turbans, hijab, and veils” when they go on an attack gave validity to this version of the story.

Wearing modest clothing to express respect for mankind and one’s commitment to and observance of Islamic teachings and precepts is a customary way for Muslims to identify themselves as followers of a faith that rejects all forms of moral decay. As a result, the extreme group’s use of this garment to commit horrible acts of violence shows a strong feeling of rebellion against everything that Islam stands for.

The use of fashion to constantly portray Islam in a bad light by Boko Haram and any other radical jihadist terrorist organization is a threat to the identity, values, teachings, and principles of Islam, noted renowned journalist and Boko Haram researcher Ishaku (2018) in a phone conversation with the authors. It will be extremely difficult to persuade people not to automatically classify someone who dresses in a way that expresses their faith as a terrorist or a member of Boko Haram if this unfavourable view is not controlled [62].

This is because the leaders of Boko Haram and other radical sects that operate throughout the Sahel typically use these divisive religious beliefs, sentiments, and ideologies to further polarize societies and foster an environment that is favourable to insurgencies. This is because these leaders completely misrepresent religion and societal norms. In a similar spirit, the Boko Haram uprising has harmed social contact amongst different groups in the area that were formerly unified despite differences in culture, religion, and ethnicity, setting the stage for distrust and separation among these communities.

These indices have been used to promote extremism and terrorism through divisive and negative doctrinal narratives, relevant actors involved in countering and combating the Boko Haram uprising must take cognizance of the ideational and identity construct of the people living in the northeast region (NE) of Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region (LCB) [63].

Boko Haram and the National Economy

The challenges that Boko Haram poses to the economies of Nigeria and the surrounding area play a major role in understanding the economic ramifications of the group’s insurrection. Ayegba (2015) made the following claim on the effects and ramifications of the Boko Haram uprising on the economy: as a result of the radical group’s actions, the economy of Nigeria and the whole northeast area has been brought to a standstill. Businesses, corporations, and financial institutions including banks and bargain stores have closed as a result of this. Additionally, it has resulted in a tremendous loss of jobs for the hordes of people whose livelihoods depended on conducting business and providing services [5].

Durotoye (2015) and Bakare (2016), pointed out that in addition to the northeast region’s economy being severely impacted by Boko Haram’s activities, also noted that the Nigerian government had suffered a billion-dollar loss of revenue from foreign direct investments, further supported this position. Given these unfavourable economic conditions, no company or organization will choose to invest in an area plagued by instability and unpredictability.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) confirmed this in its 2013 World Investment Report (WIR), which noted a 21.3% decrease in the country’s FDI (foreign direct investment) into the northeast region’s economy, amounting to approximately USD 8.9 billion in 2011 and over USD 7 billion in 2012 [66]. Nigeria was rated 115/180 internationally and 16/56 regionally in the most recent "Economic Freedom Index" study published by the Heritage Foundation (2018).

This indicates that Nigeria is among the hardest countries for investments to succeed because of the extreme insurgent group’s ongoing actions. This unfavourable evaluation was also evident in a recent analysis by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) covering the years 2014-2018, which indicated that Nigeria was placed 76/82 and received a score of 4.47/10 out of the nations that are best for business. It was believed that unfavourable elements, such as the escalating instability brought on by this extreme terrorist organization’s frequent attacks, were partly to blame for the lack of an atmosphere that was favourable for enterprises to prosper (EIU, 2018).

Nigeria has experienced financial losses as a result of this group’s ongoing operations in the areas of trade, investments, and the efficient movement of money throughout the economy.

Recent statistics from the Borno State government further supported this, showing that the group’s attacks have resulted in the wanton destruction of investments and properties worth over 1.3 trillion Naira (over USD 9 billion) in northeastern Nigeria [67]. Major General Tukur Buratai, Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff, has provided more support and validation for this by presenting a paper titled “Counter-uprising and the Role of the Nigerian Army in creating a conducive environment for Nigeria’s Economic Development”.

Major General Tukur Buratai acknowledged that the activities of the Boko Haram uprising have caused a massive economic loss in the northeastern region of Nigeria, amounting to over USD 3.5 billion (107 billion Naira) worth of agricultural produce. This has had dire consequences for the economy of both the nation and the Lake Chad Basin, whose member countries benefit from this agricultural produce [67].

Due to the rebels’ economic threats, Nigeria is no longer the only country experiencing a severe economic depression; as a result of their actions, neighbouring governments including Cameroun, Chad, and Niger have all experienced severe economic hardship. These nations had previously enjoyed peaceful trade and economic relations, but the actions of this terrorist organization have further harmed those relations. A great number of businesses have been negatively impacted, which has resulted in many businesses going comatose and job loss due to fear of sudden attacks. This financial loss has worsened the nation’s dominance in food crops [68].

From this angle, the Nigerian government’s committee for the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and rebuilding of the northeast area revealed that more than USD 9 billion would be required for the restoration and upkeep of the destroyed assets, this is a huge amount that could have been pumped into other sectors of the economy which will have a lasting effect on the citizen's welfare [16].

Conclusion

This study dwells more on the literature review and on the framework proposed by the Copenhagen School of Security via the theoretical lens of RSCT to explore the socio-economic implication of Boko Haram uprising activities particularly on poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, healthcare, and relocation in Nigeria.

It was concluded that the presence and actions of Boko Haram have a negative influence on the socio-economic development in Nigeria. Furthermore, Boko Haram persists in expanding and strengthening its base via many assaults, despite the numerous counterterrorism measures created by different stakeholders. Thus, the following recommendations were suggested to combat this deadly organization:

a) Since the Boko Haram sects perform inhumane acts, inhumane policy thrusts should be formulated and implemented to combat the group. Government should not reintegrate them back into the society.

b) Those affected by the Boko Haram uprising should be reorientated religiously and be economically empowered.

c) Education policy thrusts should be centred towards ensuring the attainment of primary and secondary education for all.

d) Issues surrounding illegal migration should be checked across borders.

e) Security stakeholders should strengthen their professional capacity for regional networks, efficient information and intelligence gathering.

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