

Hypothesis: Logical Thought Experiment on the Structure and Function of Nuclear Weapons & The Nature of Deterrence

Christopher Charles Portosa Stevens*

CEO, start-ups: CIA Design & Deep
Space Exploration, USA

***Corresponding Author**

Christopher Charles Portosa Stevens, CEO, start-ups: CIA Design & Deep Space Exploration, USA.

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Given the growth of atomic and nuclear weapons, the subject of deterrence expanded to include nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons. That is, with the invention and growth of atomic and nuclear weapons, the subject of deterrence became part of or expanded to include nuclear strategy and the organization. This includes the many security functions related to the "command, control, and communications" networks involved in or governed by or administrated by any nuclear deterrent for a particular state or a group of states such as the NATO alliance or the former WARSAW PACT, or possibly other countries that military train together in the larger U.S. military alliance, like South Korea or Japan, or the Russian Federation, China, South Africa, and possibly other countries from Central Asia or other regions.

Philosopher-Scientists including Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, argued, amongst others, that by 1945 and the end of the WWII, that the Security Council of the United Nations function as a kind of weapons or security federation demanding that countries beyond the original five Security Council members never develop nuclear weapons. Bertrand Russell wrote that the U.S. and the U.K. consider using political and military force or coercion to get the USSR and China to share control over the world's atomic and nuclear weapons, and administer the Security Council of the U.S., France, the U.K. and the former USSR and China as a Federation of states within the United Nations to enforce what was supposed to be international law: ban and oppose the spread of nuclear weapons and also other or related weapons of mass destruction. These philosopher-scientists wanted the Security Council to have the authority to seize and capture nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction pre-emptively from different Muslim countries, Israel, or possibly other countries like political parties from Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, or other countries.

What is the nature of the nuclear deterrent of nuclear weapons once a large nuclear arsenal is built? Does it remain static or stationary, or can the nuclear deterrent related to potential nuclear warfare be increased when there are threats of nuclear warfare or threats of weapons of mass destruction? In the event or events of many different kinds of nuclear threats of nuclear warfare – by states, by coalitions of states like the former WARSAW PACT, or by coalitions of states like the former USSR and Communist China, or by the Russian Federation, Communist China, and potential allies in central Asia or elsewhere, or possibly non-state actors like the A.Q. Khan network or the Al-Qaeda network or other insurgent or terrorist groups that could trade or smuggle nuclear weapons to different Muslim countries or countries in Latin America and attempt to strike Israel the U.S., other NATO alliance or other U.S. military alliance members with nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

One of the purposes of describing and detailing the structure and function of military and nuclear weapons sharing is to demonstrate and show that the potential deterrent or deterrents of nuclear warfare are increased with the cultural diversity of the nuclear deterrent, or the size of the nuclear coalition, like the NATO alliance or the former WARSAW Pact countries – independent of the sheer number of nuclear weapons or nuclear destructive capacity of nuclear weapons of any state or alliance with nuclear weapons. These statements are treated as elaborate thought experiments on this subject since it is impossible or nearly impossible to test these different scenarios with multiple experiments to see where the deterrents are greatest. Is the sheer military and destructive capacity of atomic and nuclear the only way to measure or evaluate deterrents from countries with nuclear weapons? Or, should it be recognized that the potential nuclear deterrence be evaluated as more great the more or the greater the cultural diversity of states, or the number and size of different states involved in any nuclear

coalition or nuclear alliance. This “thought experiment” on the nature of deterrence and military and nuclear weapons is from the

work: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus of Military and Nuclear Weapons Sharing.

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