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Beyond Confessional Boundaries: Januarius Asongu and the Reconstruction of Theology in Historical and Global Perspective

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Abstract

This article assesses the emerging theological contribution of Januarius Asongu within the long history of theological synthesis and contestation. It argues that his Critical Synthetic Realism (CSR), Synthetic Theological Realism (STR), and critical-liberative theology propose a mutually corrective relationship among ontological realism, historically mediated knowledge, ecclesial reform, epistemic agency, and human flourishing. The analysis situates these proposals alongside patristic and scholastic theology, the Reformation, modern Protestant and Catholic theology, Eastern Christianity, liberationist and African traditions, feminist and womanist theology, and Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist interlocutors. Rather than equating conceptual comparison with historical influence, the article distinguishes documented claims from constructive extrapolation, identifies methodological affinities and irreducible disagreements, and considers whether Asongu offers a genuinely transferable procedure for adjudicating doctrinal change. It concludes that his contribution is best understood as an emerging research program, whose promise depends on more precise rules for cross-disciplinary synthesis, sustained interreligious encounter, and independent critical reception.

Keywords: Januarius Asongu, Critical Synthetic Realism, Synthetic Theological Realism, Doctrinal Development, African Theology, Comparative Theology, Liberation, Theological Epistemology

1. Introduction: The Theological Problem of Truth in History

Theological inquiry is necessarily historical even when its subject is said to transcend history. Religious communities inherit texts, practices, institutions, and conceptual vocabularies that make inquiry possible while also delimiting the questions that can be asked. Augustine's conversion of classical philosophical resources into a Christian account of love and memory, Aquinas's use of Aristotelian distinctions, the Reformers' arguments about scriptural authority, and modern disputes about experience and revelation all testify that theology has never been a simple exercise in repeating timeless propositions. What persists is the unresolved problem of how to acknowledge the historical mediation of theological claims without confusing mediation with fabrication, or institutional continuity with infallible interpretation [1-3].

Januarius Asongu approaches this problem through a coordinated set of concepts. In his published essay on the roots of Synthetic Theological Realism, he identifies corrigibility, intelligible mediation, rational realism, and epistemic humility as mutually supporting dimensions of responsible theological reasoning [4]. His explicit account of STR affirms a real divine referent while recognizing that theological understanding is institutionally and historically conditioned [5]. His book Beyond Doctrine frames theology as accountable to freedom, dignity, and moral transformation [6]. The contribution of this cluster of proposals cannot be measured by treating any one slogan as unprecedented; the serious question is whether the proposed integration improves upon existing approaches to truth, authority, liberation, and theological change.

This article offers a comparative and critical reconstruction rather than a claim about established reception. A comparison with Augustine, Barth, or Gutiérrez concerns the architecture of an argument, not an assertion that Asongu has exercised comparable influence. The documentary basis is likewise deliberately restricted. Claims about Asongu's own positions are drawn from

identifiable publicly available essays and a publisher-confirmed book; statements about the larger traditions are grounded in identifiable editions of primary and secondary scholarship. Where the published texts do not settle an issue, the analysis poses a question instead of attributing a finished answer to the author. This distinction is essential if an appraisal is to become publishable scholarship rather than intellectual encomium.

2. Realism, Mediation, and the Criteria of Theological Judgment

The most consequential distinction in Asongu's work separates the independence of reality from the revisability of our knowledge of it. This distinction is recognizable within the larger critical realist family, although its application to religious authority is distinctive in emphasis. Bhaskar's account of a stratified reality and Lonergan's analysis of insight and judgment provide different arguments against the collapse of being into knowing [7,8]. Asongu's formulation is not simply that humans sometimes err; it is that corrigibility belongs to fidelity precisely because the theological object exceeds its conceptual representations. A tradition may preserve its referent while improving, qualifying, or sometimes abandoning a historically contingent account of that referent [4].

The claim, however, is incomplete until it specifies what would count as an improvement. Coherence alone cannot decide between internally consistent yet mutually incompatible religious systems; moral usefulness alone cannot establish a metaphysical proposition; and appeal to historical continuity can perpetuate inherited mistakes. A defensible synthetic method must distinguish evidential warrant, conceptual consistency, historical continuity, explanatory fruitfulness, and ethical consequences, then articulate which are indispensable constraints and which are comparative considerations. Lonergan's differentiated operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding suggest one way to resist the confusion of these registers, but Asongu must develop his own explicit decision procedure if CSR is to do more than rename responsible theological inquiry [9].

There is a second difficulty: interdisciplinary exchange is not the same as explanatory equivalence. Neuroscience may study neural correlates of prayer without deciding whether God exists; historical criticism may date a scriptural text without deciding whether its normative claims are true; psychology may document religious injury without settling the ontology of sacramental grace. Synthesis must therefore specify relations of compatibility, constraint, and underdetermination. Asongu's insistence on intelligible mediation is valuable because it avoids an implausible appeal to unmediated certainty, yet it must also guard against the temptation to let a preferred moral vocabulary resolve disagreements that require historical or metaphysical argument.

3. Patristic Theology: Origen, Augustine, Athanasius, and the Cappadocians

The patristic achievement consisted neither in preserving an untouched biblical idiom nor in translating Christianity without remainder into Greek philosophy. Origen's systematic inquiry, Athanasius's defense of the incarnation, and the Cappadocians' conceptual distinctions concerning divine unity and personal difference emerged from controversy, exegetical debate, and engagement with philosophical vocabularies. The history of doctrine therefore already complicates the opposition between continuity and development. Theological speech may change in order to clarify what communities believe remains constant, although the fact of change cannot by itself demonstrate that the resulting doctrine is warranted [10].

Augustine offers the most instructive anthropological comparison. The Confessions places memory, desire, disordered love, and self-deception within an account of conversion whose ultimate horizon is God [1]. Asongu's category of epistemic fracture similarly treats human failure as more than isolated rule breaking: distorted interpretation and institutional habits can estrange persons from truthful participation. Yet an epistemic description is not automatically an adequate account of culpability. Augustine's account of will and love reminds the contemporary theologian that people sometimes choose a recognized evil, and that wounded understanding may be an effect of victimization rather than a fault of the victim. A persuasive reconstruction must hold together cognition, volition, affect, embodiment, and social structures.

Athanasius and the Cappadocians expose a further limitation of a purely epistemological reconstruction. Classical Christian theology is not only a theory about correct knowledge; it makes claims about divine life, incarnation, worship, and participation in God. A framework that explains how doctrinal statements are revised still owes an account of what makes its substantive claims specifically theological. In this respect the patristic comparison reveals both the strength of Asongu's account of mediation and the need for a thicker theology of revelation, grace, and liturgical participation.

4. Scholastic and Medieval Traditions: Anselm, Aquinas, and Maimonides

Anselm's faith seeking understanding and Aquinas's treatment of sacred doctrine show that disciplined reason can be a constitutive activity of religious fidelity rather than its rival. Aquinas's distinctions between what reason can demonstrate and what is received through revelation, together with his account of analogical predication, are especially relevant to a realism that refuses to identify theological language with exhaustive possession of divine reality [2]. Asongu's call for rational realism belongs to this family resemblance, though his insistence on institutional self-critique makes the social location of the interpreter more conspicuous than in conventional scholastic presentations.

A comparison beyond Christianity sharpens the analysis. Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed confronts the inadequacy of uncritical literalism and insists on the limits of positive speech about God [11]. His negative theological discipline shows that the problem of mediation and transcendence is not a uniquely Christian invention. Nevertheless, negative theology and synthetic

realism do not reach identical conclusions: one may emphasize the failure of predicates to capture divine essence, while the other seeks a critically defensible integration of explanatory claims. A genuinely interreligious CSR would need to show whether it can accommodate the former without covertly requiring a Christian account of revelation as its default measure.

The medieval encounter also cautions against using 'scholasticism' as shorthand for immobility. Medieval disputation institutionalized objections and replies, and the plurality of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim philosophical traditions made intellectual exchange more complex than a single confessional narrative allows. Asongu's prospective originality is consequently better located in the social and emancipatory uses to which he puts critical synthesis than in the mere affirmation that faith and reason can cooperate.

5. Reformation and Post-Reformation: Luther, Calvin, and Authority

The Reformation's most enduring theological challenge was not simply to replace one institutional center with another, but to ask how ecclesial claims could be judged when authoritative institutions were themselves implicated in disputed practices. Luther's account of justification and Calvin's systematic exposition of Christian teaching differed in significant respects, yet both intensified questions about Scripture, conscience, grace, and the legitimacy of inherited authority [12]. Asongu's criticism of closed interpretive systems belongs to this broader history of reform. He adds the claim that religious domination may operate through the conditions under which people learn to regard certain propositions as beyond question.

The comparison also reveals a substantial disagreement about agency. An account centered on epistemic sovereignty might appear to make the liberated knower the decisive actor in salvation, whereas classical Protestant theology insists upon divine initiative and the incapacity of unaided human achievement to secure reconciliation. Asongu need not abandon human agency to respond, but he must distinguish the epistemic responsibility of believers from the theological claim that grace is unearned. Otherwise a project designed to liberate persons from authoritarianism could unintentionally replace theological dependence with a demanding ideal of self-mastery.

Luther's theology of the cross poses a related question: can a synthetic method acknowledge a revelation that judges rather than confirms our criteria of plausibility? If a theological claim is rejected whenever it appears paradoxical or resistant to harmonization, the method risks domesticating traditions whose central claims include divine hiddenness and suffering. Responsible synthesis must allow genuine tensions to remain visible instead of forcing every tradition into a premature consensus.

6. Modern Theology: Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, Barth, and Tillich

Modern theology repeatedly negotiated the relationship among subjective experience, historical criticism, and divine initiative. Schleiermacher's attention to religious consciousness secured a place for lived experience in theological description; Kierkegaard emphasized existential appropriation and the limits of system; Barth rejected the attempt to derive the knowledge of God from generalized religious or cultural experience; Tillich sought a correlation between existential questions and the Christian message [13-15]. These approaches constitute genuine alternatives, not successive stages of a single inevitable advance.

Asongu's synthetic project resembles Tillich's in its willingness to engage philosophy and the human sciences, but it differs in making epistemic corrigibility and realism the explicit methodological center. Barth would object that the method may place a philosophical tribunal above revelation; Kierkegaard would worry that synthesis cannot capture the singular difficulty of existing in faith. Both objections are instructive. If the ultimate referent of theology can correct the knower, then theological realism must permit revelation to challenge the very rules by which the interpreter initially judges it. Yet appeals to revelation cannot serve as a blanket exemption from scrutiny, since claims about revelation arrive through particular witnesses and traditions.

A productive answer requires a layered account of theological judgment. The historian may assess the formation of a claim, the philosopher its intelligibility, the community its continuity with inherited practices, and the ethicist its consequences; none of these operations simply replaces the others. The theological task is to explain how these partial judgments can constrain one another without being confused. Asongu's terminology gives this task a name, but a major scholarly contribution will depend on how successfully he demonstrates the procedure in contested cases.

7. Eastern Christian Theology: Lossky, Zizioulas, and Participation

Eastern Christian theology offers a crucial test of a project that seeks to speak beyond Catholic categories. Lossky's mystical theology resists the reduction of divine reality to conceptual mastery, while Zizioulas's account of personhood and communion places relational participation at the center of theological anthropology [16,17]. These thinkers provide resources for Asongu's language of truthful participation, but they also complicate the assumption that epistemological repair adequately captures salvation. Theosis is not merely improved judgment or ethical self-direction; it concerns participation in divine life as understood within sacramental and ascetical traditions.

The comparison highlights a productive tension between intellectual humility and positive synthesis. Apophatic theology insists that theological concepts fail before divine mystery, yet that failure is not simply a deficit to be overcome by adding further disciplines. A synthetic realist might reply that humility governs the process of integration and prohibits total conceptual closure. Such a reply would be promising, but it must demonstrate respect for forms of theological knowledge that are liturgical, contemplative, and performative rather than primarily propositional.

Eastern ecclesiology also offers an alternative lens on institutional authority. Communion and conciliarity cannot be reduced to decentralization, nor can institutional critique substitute for an account of ecclesial unity. If Asongu's polycentric theological imagination is to be persuasive across Christian traditions, it must examine how shared worship, doctrinal boundaries, and local authority relate, rather than assuming that multiplying centers automatically improves the truthfulness of ecclesial life.

8. Newman, Rahner, Congar, and Lonergan: Catholic Development and Method

Newman's account of doctrinal development remains an unavoidable comparator because it rejects the identification of continuity with verbal immobility while proposing marks of authentic development [13]. Asongu's published essay on evolving doctrine revisits this problem through ontological realism, epistemic fallibilism, and the concepts of epistemic fracture and sovereignty [18]. The possible advance is to connect historical continuity with an explicit account of the knower's susceptibility to ideology and the ethical costs of interpretive closure. The unresolved question is whether the proposed criteria can distinguish legitimate development from contradiction in cases where historical continuity and contemporary moral judgment appear to pull in opposite directions.

Rahner's transcendental anthropology, Congar's ecclesiology of reform, and Lonergan's theological method show that Catholic theology already possesses extensive resources for integrating historical consciousness with doctrinal seriousness [9,19,20]. An accurate appraisal should therefore resist depicting Asongu as the first to discover the fallibility of theological formulations. His work instead attempts to join these concerns to a more overtly emancipatory analysis of institutions and to a cross-disciplinary vocabulary of epistemic injury and recovery.

The central methodological comparison is with Lonergan. Lonergan's differentiated functional specialties impose intellectual discipline on the movement from research and interpretation to judgment and communication. CSR will become more useful when it similarly specifies the tasks performed by historical inquiry, philosophical analysis, empirical research, doctrinal reasoning, and pastoral evaluation. Until then, the claim of integration is programmatic rather than fully demonstrated.

9. Liberation, Black, Feminist, and Womanist Theologies

Gutiérrez and Cone established that theological accounts of salvation and revelation are ethically compromised when they fail to confront concrete histories of poverty and racial domination [21,22]. Asongu's Beyond Doctrine shares their conviction that religious truth cannot be insulated from the social uses of theological language. His distinctive contribution may be to describe oppression partly as an epistemic achievement of institutions: injustice persists when inherited narratives make domination appear natural, necessary, or sacred. Such an analysis is valuable, but the correction of false narratives cannot substitute for transforming laws, economic arrangements, and organizational incentives that perpetuate injury.

Feminist and womanist theologians sharpen the critique. Ruether and Johnson question androcentric theological language and authority, while Delores Williams exposes the danger of universalizing accounts of redemption that overlook the particular historical experiences of Black women [23-25]. A synthetic method cannot treat these contributions as supplementary perspectives that enrich a framework whose central categories remain untouched. They must be permitted to challenge the framework's conceptions of rationality, agency, sacrifice, and flourishing. A theory that prizes emancipation but lacks a mechanism for revising its own exclusions contradicts its governing purpose.

A further challenge concerns the status of suffering. Theologies of liberation resist the sentimental claim that suffering is automatically redemptive, yet many religious traditions interpret costly solidarity as an expression of faithfulness. Asongu's emphasis on flourishing needs an account of the difference between suffering imposed by domination and suffering freely endured in resistance to domination. Without that distinction, theological ethics risks identifying liberation with comfort or treating all hardship as evidence of failure.

10. African Theology, Decoloniality, and Epistemic Reciprocity

Mbiti, Bediako, and Oduyoye have each challenged the assumption that European categories exhaust the intellectual possibilities of Christian theology [26-28]. Asongu's emphasis on epistemic sovereignty belongs within this conversation, but his essay 'Truth Has No Passport' introduces an important distinction between the social geography of knowledge production and the ontology of what is known [29]. The fact that knowledge is situated does not entail that truth itself is owned by a particular culture. This claim can support a nonprovincial account of African intellectual agency: African perspectives need neither imitate European systems nor assert immunity from shared standards of argument.

Such universalism nevertheless requires vigilance. Appeals to universal reason have historically been used to disguise local assumptions as neutral norms. Decolonial scholarship insists that the conditions under which arguments become visible, publishable, and institutionally authoritative are unequally distributed [30]. CSR should therefore distinguish universal validity from unequal access to the institutions that adjudicate validity. The former is a philosophical claim; the latter is a historical and political problem. Neither can be settled by dismissing the other.

The strongest African contribution of Asongu's theology may lie in this reciprocal posture. Rather than offering an isolated African counter-system, it asks every tradition to expose its claims to criticism by others while refusing to equate critique with the surrender of identity. Its practical test would be whether it changes whose questions count, whose experiences are investigated, and how theological institutions revise their judgments when confronted by previously excluded evidence.

11. Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist Interlocutors

Theology as a whole cannot be adequately represented by an expanded catalogue of Christian denominations. Jewish theological reasoning provides resources for reflecting on revelation, interpretation, covenant, and disagreement, while Muslim kalām and philosophy developed rigorous accounts of divine unity, causation, and the relationship between reason and transmitted authority. Maimonides' apophatic concerns and al-Ghazālī's examination of philosophical claims demonstrate that the critique of conceptual overreach is not a modern Christian discovery [11,31]. Asongu's commitment to realism may offer common ground, but shared words such as truth and revelation do not guarantee shared accounts of their meaning.

Comparative theology requires slow attention to the internal grammars of traditions rather than a rapid search for equivalences. Clooney's account of learning across religious borders is particularly useful because comparison changes the interpreter without requiring that differences be dissolved into a generic spirituality [32]. Hindu Vedānta traditions and Buddhist philosophies challenge Christian assumptions about selfhood, ultimate reality, and liberation in ways that cannot responsibly be summarized as alternative expressions of salvation. A synthetic realist method must specify whether it is conducting comparison, philosophical adjudication, or constructive appropriation, and acknowledge that these are different activities.

The hardest case is genuine contradiction. A Christian confession of incarnation, an Islamic account of divine unity, and a Buddhist analysis of nonself cannot all be assimilated without conceptual loss. If CSR asserts objective truth, it must permit the possibility that rival claims are incompatible; if it asserts humility, it must acknowledge that its own judgment may be mistaken. The combination is demanding but not incoherent. It would become fruitful if Asongu demonstrated, through sustained case studies, how to make comparative judgments that are rationally accountable without assuming that the Christian vocabulary supplies the answer in advance.

12. Psychology, Sin, Salvation, and the Limits of Therapeutic Language

Asongu's use of epistemic fracture suggests a way to connect theological anthropology with psychological descriptions of self-deception, trauma, and distorted agency. His publisher describes Beyond Doctrine as a critical-liberative theology of freedom and moral transformation, while his public essays explicitly relate knowledge, correction, and human flourishing [4,6]. The attraction is clear: sin can be considered not only as a juridical violation but as a disorder in truthful relationship to self, neighbor, institution, and God. This account is especially helpful when investigating religious systems that normalize cruelty by persuading adherents that their obedience is a moral virtue.

But the language of fracture carries clinical and ethical risks. Trauma survivors may experience distrust, fragmentation, or difficulty making decisions because of harms they did not cause. It would be gravely mistaken to classify those consequences as culpable sin. Theological analysis must distinguish wrongdoing, cognitive limitation, involuntary suffering, and the morally ambiguous habits by which people survive oppression. Similarly, improved psychological functioning cannot be equated without argument with reconciliation to God. Clinical effectiveness and theological truth involve different forms of warrant.

A fuller soteriology would need to explain how restored epistemic agency relates to grace, forgiveness, sanctification, communal reconciliation, and eschatological hope. Moltmann's eschatological theology reminds us that religious hope exceeds the achievement of present well-being [33]. The language of flourishing is useful only if it can accommodate costly moral fidelity, suffering that is not deserved, and the possibility that salvation is more than the successful repair of human capacities.

13. Church, Mission, and Polycentric Theological Authority

Walls and Sanneh show that Christianity's global history has involved translation, local appropriation, and the formation of multiple centers of intellectual and spiritual initiative [34,35]. Asongu's concern with epistemic sovereignty gives this history a normative interpretation: communities receiving a tradition should not be denied the capacity to interpret, criticize, and contribute to its development. Yet a polycentric Christianity does not follow automatically from a merely geographical redistribution of institutions. It requires an account of mutual accountability, shared sources, and the procedures by which conflicts can be judged.

Asongu's essay on theological architecture links CSR, STR, critical-liberative theology, epistemic fracture, and epistemic sovereignty into a wider program [36]. This vocabulary can illuminate how mission becomes domination when a sending culture treats its own habits as the substance of revelation. Nevertheless, the same critique applies to new centers of authority: no culture becomes epistemically immune because it was previously marginalized. Reciprocity requires all participants to accept both the right to speak and the responsibility to answer objections.

The ecclesiological stakes are concrete. Questions of sacramental practice, leadership, safeguarding, and doctrinal teaching involve institutions with coercive and formative powers. A constructive theology should show how its epistemic commitments alter procedures for hearing testimony, reviewing error, and protecting dissenters from retaliation. In the absence of such institutional detail, a theology of reform may remain rhetorically compelling while exerting little influence on the practices it criticizes.

14. Objections, Methodological Tests, and Prospects for Reception

The first objection is that CSR repackages well-established insights from critical realism, hermeneutics, liberation theology, and historical theology. This criticism is partly justified: neither fallibilism nor the relationship between knowledge and power begins with Asongu. Yet constructive originality can consist in

a new configuration of inherited arguments. The decisive test is whether the configuration yields analyses that its components, considered separately, would not readily produce. This requires worked examples, explicit criteria, and engagement with counterexamples, not simply an expanding list of compatible thinkers.

A second objection is that emancipation threatens to become an unacknowledged truth criterion. If a doctrine is deemed true because it produces desirable outcomes, theological realism has been replaced by pragmatism; if it is deemed false solely because institutions have misused it, the argument confuses a proposition with its application. Asongu can answer by treating ethical consequences as a serious diagnostic consideration rather than an independent demonstration of metaphysical truth. Harm may expose defects in interpretation, implementation, or underlying assumptions, but the precise defect still has to be argued.

A third objection concerns the reach of the synthesis. No scholar can adjudicate the full range of historical, scientific, philosophical, and religious claims by an undifferentiated appeal to integration. A plausible next stage would identify a small set of necessary conditions—logical consistency, evidential accountability appropriate to the claim, and transparent acknowledgment of interpretive mediation—alongside weighted comparative criteria such as historical continuity, explanatory range, moral fruitfulness, and dialogical responsiveness. The relative weighting must be stated and defended; otherwise the same criteria can be rearranged to ratify opposing conclusions.

A fourth objection is that the corpus has not yet achieved the independent scholarly reception necessary for confident claims of historical importance. This is correct and should be stated without embarrassment. Publication establishes that a proposal is available for criticism, not that it has transformed a field. The relevant scholarly task is to reconstruct the argument charitably, identify its limits precisely, and invite further testing. On this measure, Asongu's contribution is an emerging program rather than a completed theological school.

15. Conclusion

Asongu's theological significance is most plausibly located in the attempt to make realism and correction, continuity and development, intellectual agency and communal accountability, and doctrinal inquiry and liberation answerable to one another. His publicly identifiable writings present a coherent ambition: theological statements refer to realities not created by their interpreters, but their formulation and institutional use remain open to disciplined examination [4,5,18]. The project thereby participates in a conversation stretching from patristic synthesis and medieval disputation through Reformation criticism, modern debates over revelation and experience, and contemporary struggles over coloniality, gender, race, and religious pluralism.

The comparisons undertaken here do not establish parity of historical influence with Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Barth, Rahner, or Cone. They establish the more modest and intellectually useful point that Asongu is addressing problems those thinkers helped define, often by connecting their insights across disciplinary and confessional boundaries. His proposals will acquire greater significance if he demonstrates how synthetic criteria operate in disputed doctrinal cases, distinguishes empirical from theological forms of warrant, allows non-Christian traditions to challenge his premises, and translates epistemic responsibility into institutional practices. The future of this work lies less in announcing a new comprehensive system than in showing, through sustained criticism and concrete applications, what responsible theological reconstruction can actually accomplish.

Comparative Map of the Argument

Conversation	Affinity with Asongu	Unresolved tension
Patristic / Augustine	Sin, knowledge, relational disorder	Knowledge versus will and grace
Scholastic / Aquinas	Realism, analogy, reason	Distinct explanatory levels
Reformation / Luther	Critique of institutional authority	Divine initiative and epistemic agency
Modern / Barth and Tillich	Revelation, experience, correlation	Priority of revelation
Catholic / Newman and Lonergan	Development and method	Operational criteria
Eastern / Lossky and Zizioulas	Mystery and participation	Theosis beyond cognition
Liberation / Gutiérrez and Cone	Emancipation and structural critique	Material versus epistemic change
African / Mbiti and Oduyoye	Reciprocal theological authority	Universal validity and situated power
Comparative / Clooney	Cross-tradition learning	Irreducible contradictions

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